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I. INTRODUCTION
Designed to promote economic and judicial efficiency, Nebraska's
at-will employment doctrine is rooted in the notion that employers
(rather than courts) are best positioned to manage the workplace.1
Yet application of a rule that enables employers to terminate employ-
ees at any time for any reason-absent constitutional, statutory, or
contractual limitations-can lead to harsh results. 2 Given the imbal-
ance in power and resources between employers and employees, the
need to balance efficiency with fairness manifests itself in common
law exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine. 3 Most frequent
1. The traditional common law rule, known as employment at-will, provided that an
employer could terminate an employee "for good cause, for no cause or even for
cause morally wrong." Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884),
overruled on other grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947,
947-48 (1984). Courts and commentators alike have stated:
[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they
please, and to discharge or retain employees at will for good cause or for
no cause, or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an unlaw-
ful act per se. It is a right which an employee may exercise in the same
way, to the same extent, for the same cause or want of cause as the
employer.
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947,
947-48 (1984) (quoting Payne, 81 Tenn. at 518-19).
2. See generally Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge:
The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1931 (1983).
3. Epstein, supra note 1, at 949. Epstein stated:
"It is a widely accepted proposition that large corporations now pose a
threat to individual freedom comparable to that which would be posed if
governmental power were unchecked. The proposition need not, how-
ever, be limited to the mammoth business corporation, for the freedom of
the individual is threatened whenever he becomes dependent upon a pri-
vate entity possessing greater power than himself. Foremost among the
relationships of which this generality is true is that of employer and em-
ployee." The contract at will is thus thought to be particularly unwise
because it invites the exercise of arbitrary power by persons with a domi-
nant economic position against individuals whose mobility is said to be
limited by the structure of the labor markets.
Epstein, supra note 1, at 949 (quoting Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will
v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967)).
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among these is a common law exception that forbids employers from
terminating employees when doing so clearly violates public policy.4
In Nebraska and elsewhere, courts engage in an efficiency versus
fairness tug-of-war to determine the proper scope of the public policy
exception. Where the exception is widened, theory suggests that a
more employee-friendly workplace is achieved at the expense of eco-
nomic and judicial efficiency as employers and courts become increas-
ingly entangled in litigating workplace disputes. 5 Where the
exception is narrow, theory suggests that employers are empowered to
manage employees as they see fit. A more responsive and productive
workforce is achieved resulting in increased overall economic effi-
ciency, but employees have less legal protection from employers. In
addition to debating the merits of the public policy exception, courts
struggle with whether such policy concerns should be left entirely to
the state legislature.
6
In Trosper v. Bag 'N Save,7 the Nebraska Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether an employee's demotion for seeking compensation
rightfully owed him under the State's workers' compensation laws
falls within the State's public policy exception to the at-will employ-
ment doctrine. Already having recognized a public policy exception
when an employee is discharged for seeking compensation under the
State's workers' compensation laws,8 the specific issue facing the
Court was whether retaliatory demotion should be protected to the
same extent as retaliatory discharge.9
Part II of this Note provides the background law relevant to Tros-
per. Section A offers a brief synopsis on Nebraska's at-will employ-
ment doctrine and application of the public policy exception. Section B
summarizes the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Tros-
per. Section C addresses case law from other jurisdictions that the
Court extensively relied on in Trosper. The crux of this Note is the
Analysis contained in Part III, which is broken into two closely related
sections. Section A contends that Trosper reached the proper conclu-
sion by holding that a private right of action for retaliatory demotion
is necessary when a private right of action for retaliatory discharge
has already been recognized, but recognizes that doing so inserts am-
biguity into the law. Section B seeks to resolve that ambiguity by pro-
viding a guidebook for courts and employers dealing with the nebulous
4. Frank J. Cavico, Employment at Will and Public Policy, 25 AKRON L. REV. 497
(1992) ("The most widely-accepted and expansive approach employed by the
courts emerges as the 'public policy' exception.").
5. Epstein, supra note 1.
6. See generally Mark Fahleson, The Public Policy Exception to Employment at
Will-When Should Courts Defer to the Legislature?, 72 NEB. L. REV. 956 (1993).
7. 273 Neb. 855, 734 N.W.2d 704 (2007).
8. Jackson v. Morris Commc'ns Corp., 265 Neb. 423, 657 N.W.2d 634 (2003).
9. Trosper, 273 Neb. at 856, 734 N.W.2d at 706.
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concept of retaliatory demotion. Part IV offers some concluding
thoughts on how courts and employers should address the post-Tros-
per ambiguity.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Nebraska's Public Policy Exception to the At-Will
Employment Doctrine
Nebraska's clear and frequently cited at-will employment doctrine
provides that "unless constitutionally, statutorily, or contractually
prohibited, an employer, without incurring liability, may terminate an
at-will employee at any time with or without reason." 10 Though such
language allows employers to manage their workforce without judicial
interference, an employer's ability to hire and fire employees is not
without limitation. To "temper ... harsh and unjust results from the
rigid application" of the rule,1 Nebraska's common law recognizes a
public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, under
which an employee can claim damages for wrongful discharge when
the court holds that the motivation for the firing clearly contravenes
public policy.12 As a way of keeping the public policy exception within
a clear and manageable standard, Nebraska recognizes a mandate of
public policy only where criminal sanctions or explicit statutory direc-
tives exist, or legislative intent is easily ascertainable. 13
Nebraska's Supreme Court first applied the public policy exception
in Ambroz v. Cornhusker Square Ltd.,14 where the plaintiff-employee
was discharged for refusing the defendant-employer's demand to sub-
mit to a polygraph examination. Finding the requisite public policy
expressed in NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1932 (Reissue 1981), which pro-
vided that "[o employer or prospective employer may require as a
condition of employment or as a condition for continued employment
that a person submit to a truth and deception examination," the Court
10. Wendeln v. Beatrice Manor, Inc., 271 Neb. 373, 385, 712 N.W.2d 226, 238 (2006).
Accord Jackson, 265 Neb. at 425-26, 657 N.W.2d at 636; Malone v. Am. Bus.
Info., 262 Neb. 733, 735, 634 N.W.2d 788, 790 (2001); Schriner v. Meginnis Ford
Co., 228 Neb. 85, 87, 421 N.W.2d 755, 757 (1988); Ambroz v. Cornhusker Square
Ltd., 226 Neb. 899, 901, 416 N.W.2d 510, 513 (1987); Simonsen v. Hendricks Sod-
ding & Landscaping, Inc., 5 Neb. App. 263, 268, 558 N.W.2d 825, 829 (Ct. App.
1997).
11. Fahleson, supra note 6, at 957.
12. Wendeln, 271 Neb. 373, 712 N.W.2d 226; Jackson, 265 Neb. 423,657 N.W.2d 634;
Malone, 262 Neb. 733, 634 N.W.2d 788; Schriner, 228 Neb. 85, 421 N.W.2d 755;
Ambroz, 226 Neb. 899, 416 N.W.2d 510; Simonsen, 5 Neb. App. 263, 558 N.W.2d
825.
13. Jackson, 265 Neb. 423, 657 N.W.2d 634; Schriner, 228 Neb. 85, 421 N.W.2d 755;
Ambroz, 226 Neb. 899, 416 N.W.2d 510.
14. 226 Neb. 899, 416 N.W.2d 510.
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held that the discharge was a "violation of a clear, statutorily man-
dated public policy."15
The background case most relevant to Trosper--Jackson v. Morris
Communications 16-involved an employee who was discharged after
filing a workers' compensation claim. The Jackson Court noted that
the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act (NWCA) "does not specifi-
cally prohibit an employer from discharging an employee for filing a
claim, nor does it specifically make it a crime for an employer to do
so."17 However, the Court noted that other jurisdictions recognize an
exception, even in the absence of a specific statutory prohibition,
based on the policy merits of promoting economic security for injured
employees and their dependents.1S Similarly, the Court recognized
that it has consistently given the NWCA a "liberal construction to
'carry out justly the spirit of the [NWCA]."'19 Because "a rule which
allows fear of retaliation for the filing of a claim undermines that pol-
icy,"20 the Court held that a public policy exception to Nebraska's at-
will employment doctrine applies to allow a cause of action for retalia-
tory discharge when an employee is fired for seeking workers'
compensation. 2 '
B. Trosper v. Bag 'N Save
1. Facts
While employed as a "deli manager" for Bag 'N Save, Kimberlee
Trosper suffered a work-related injury that required medical treat-
ment. After reporting her injury to Bag 'N Save and filing for compen-
sation under the NWCA, the company demoted Trosper from "deli
manager" to "deli clerk." Bag 'N Save also reduced Trosper's annual
salary from $30,100 to $22,500.22 Though Trosper was demoted
rather than discharged, Trosper brought an action against her em-
ployer, alleging that Bag 'N Save acted in a retaliatory manner con-
15. Id. at 905, 416 N.W.2d at 515.
16. Jackson, 265 Neb. 423, 657 N.W.2d 634.
17. Id. at 428, 657 N.W.2d at 638.
18. See, e.g., Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394, 396 (Nev. 1984) (quoting Nev. Indus.
Comm'n v. Peck, 239 P.2d 244, 248 (Nev. 1952)).
Unquestionably, compensation laws were enacted as a humanitarian
measure. The modern trend is to construe the industrial insurance acts
broadly and liberally, to protect the interest of the injured worker and
his dependents. A reasonable, liberal and practical construction is pref-
erable to a narrow one, since these acts are enacted for the purpose of
giving compensation, not for the denial thereof.
19. Jackson, 265 Neb. at 431, 657 N.W.2d at 640 (quoting Phillips v. Monroe Auto
Equip. Co., 251 Neb. 585, 558 N.W.2d 799 (1997)).
20. Id. at 432, 657 N.W.2d at 640-41.
21. Id. at 432, 657 N.W.2d at 641.
22. Trosper v. Bag 'N Save, 273 Neb. 855, 856, 734 N.W.2d 704, 706 (2007).
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trary to Jackson.23 Bag 'N Save moved to dismiss the action, alleging
that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. 24 Because Nebraska law did not recognize a private cause of
action for retaliatory demotion, the trial court sustained the motion
and dismissed the complaint. Trosper appealed, arguing that demo-
tion, like discharge, frustrated the public policy underlying the
NWCA.25
2. Majority and Concurring Opinions
Using Jackson as a framework for its analysis, the Court noted
that when it created a private remedy for employees who had been
discharged in retaliation for seeking workers' compensation, "[the
Court] reasoned that 'a rule which allows fear of retaliation for the
filing of a claim undermines [the important public policy of the
NWCA].' And [the Court] stated that 'the employee must be able to
exercise his right in an unfettered fashion without being subject to
reprisal."'26 Accordingly, the Court concluded that allowing employers
to demote an employee for filing a workers' compensation claim would
circumvent the policy in Jackson and thus a private remedy for retali-
atory demotion was required:
An employee's right to be free from retaliatory demotion for filing a worker's
compensation claim is married to the right to be free from discharge. Demo-
tion, like termination, coercively affects an employee's exercise of his or her
rights under the [NWCA]. If we fail to recognize a claim for retaliatory demo-
tion, it would create an incentive for employers to merely demote, rather than
discharge, employees who exercise their rights. To promote such behavior
would compromise the act and would render illusory the cause of action for
retaliatory discharge. Thus, we believe that extending the tort created in
Jackson to include retaliatory demotion is a logical step, and one which gives
vitality to that decision.
2 7
The majority and concurring opinions also rebutted the prevailing
arguments against extending the public policy exception to include re-
taliatory demotion. First, the Court dismissed the distinction between
discharge and demotion as uncompelling. "Although Jackson specifi-
cally addressed discharge," the Court explained, "the intent in Jack-
son was to protect the important public policy and beneficent purpose
of the [NWCA]. Although demotion is less harsh than dismissal, nev-
ertheless, it would shrink an employee's right to pursue workers' com-
pensation."2s Employees' fear of demotion would reduce their
23. Id.
24. Id. at 857, 734 N.W.2d at 706.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 864, 734 N.W.2d at 711 (quoting Jackson, 265 Neb. at 429, 657 N.W.2d at
639).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 865-66, 734 N.W.2d at 712.
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willingness to file for workers' compensation rightfully owed them and
thus circumvent the policy of the NWCA.
Next, recognizing that Trosper may result in increased litigation of
workplace disputes, the majority opinion admitted that, "allowing a
cause of action for retaliatory demotion could result in claims for other
retaliatory conduct."29 Despite promising to "deal with those concerns
case-by-case,"30 the majority opinion provided little guidance for doing
so. The concurring opinion, however, went to great lengths to dispel
this ambiguity, suggesting application of the United States Supreme
Court's McDonnell Douglas3 1 burden-shifting analysis as an analyti-
cal framework for resolving retaliatory demotion cases.32 The McDon-
nell Douglas burden-shifting analysis has frequently been applied by
Nebraska's highest court in employment discrimination cases, most
recently in Riesen v. Irwin Industrial Tool Co.
33
Finally, both the majority and concurring opinions acknowledged
that the NWCA does not contain a statutory prohibition that prevents
employers from terminating or retaliating against employees who
seek compensation under the NWCA, but nevertheless warrants judi-
cial intervention when employers do so. The majority opinion cited
other states which have recognized similar public policy exceptions ab-
sent a clear statutory ban.34 It also noted that the NWCA serves the
important public purpose of protecting injured workers and their de-
pendents from the adverse economic effects of work-related injuries.35
"This duty 'would be seriously frustrated if employers were able to
prevent employees from filing claims through the threat of dis-
29. Id. at 866, 734 N.W.2d at 712.
30. Id.
31. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
32. Trosper, 273 Neb. at 868, 734 N.W.2d at 713 (Gerrard, J., concurring).
33. 272 Neb. 41, 48, 717 N.W.2d 907, 914 (2006).
Establishing a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation requires showing
(1) plaintiffs involvement in a protected activity, (2) the employer took
an adverse employment action (i.e., a change in employment status sig-
nificant enough to dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in the
activity protected by public policy) against the employee, and (3) a causal
connection between the protected activity and adverse employment
action.
Id. at 48-49, 717 N.W.2d at 915. If the employee succeeds in proving the prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, lawful
reason for the adverse employment action. Id. at 47, 717 N.W.2d at 914. If the
employer articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for disparate treatment of the
employee, the employee maintains the burden of proving that the stated reason
was pretextual. Id. at 48, 717 N.W.2d at 914.
34. Trosper, 273 Neb. at 859, 734 N.W.2d at 707 (citing Murphy v. City of Topeka-
Shawnee County Dept. of Labor Servs., 630 P.2d 186 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); Han-
sen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984)).
35. Trosper, 273 Neb. at 859, 734 N.W.2d at 707-08.
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charge."' 36 The concurring opinion emphasized that enactment alone
of the NWCA represents the public policy of this State and the Court's
holding merely upholds the Legislature's intent.3 7
3. Dissenting Opinion
Singing the old-and-familiar tune that judges should not legislate
from the bench,3S the dissent concluded that "whether or to what ex-
tent the public policy considerations underlying the NWCA require or
warrant regulation of the terms and conditions of an existing at-will
employment relationship" should be left for the Nebraska Legislature
to decide.3 9 As the dissent pointed out, "[t]he Legislature has enacted
statutes prohibiting retaliation or discrimination based upon an em-
ployee's exercise of certain statutory rights,"40 but no statutory prohi-
bition exists in the NWCA. By holding that "an implicit declaration of
public policy can serve as the basis of an employment discrimination
claim in a nondischarge situation," the majority opinion acts as
though such a statute does exist.4 1
Despite concluding that policy concerns should be left entirely to
the state legislature, the dissent did not resist inserting a policy argu-
ment of its own. Specifically, the dissent argued that an employer
should be free to determine the makeup of its workforce without judi-
36. Id. at 859, 734 N.W.2d at 708 (quoting Jackson v. Morris Commc'ns Corp., 265
Neb. 423, 431, 657 N.W.2d 634, 640 (2003)).
37. Id. at 872, 734 N.W.2d at 715 (Gerrard, J., concurring) ("[I]t was the very point of
[Jackson] that the Legislature has declared the public policy of this state, by en-
acting the [NWCA].").
38. Fahleson, supra note 6, at 975 n.96 ("Were the power of judging joined with the
legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary con-
trol, for the judge would then be the legislator." (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47
(James Madison))). Justice Scalia made this same basic argument in Webster v.
Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). For an excellent summary of Scalia's
argument, see David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The
Emerging Dispute Between Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia Over Enumer-
ated Fundamental Rights, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 895, 910-11 (1993):
Justice Scalia's stance exemplifies the representative democratic
view of our governmental system. Scalia insists that Justices' personal
views should not replace the will of the people. Our system does not
grant judges the power to instill their values in law, but only the power
to protect specifically enumerated constitutional rights. To receive addi-
tional protections, citizens can create other enforceable liberties through
the legislative process.
Id. at 911.
39. Trosper, 273 Neb. at 876-77, 734 N.W.2d at 717-18 (Stephan, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 877, 734 N.W.2d at 718-19 (Stephan, J., dissenting) (citing NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 48-1004 (2004) (prohibiting discrimination based upon assertion of rights under
statute prohibiting age discrimination in employment) and NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-
1114 (2004) (prohibiting discrimination based upon exercise of rights under Fair
Employment Practice Act)).
41. Id. at 875, 734 N.W.2d at 717-18 (Stephan, J., dissenting).
2008]
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cial oversight.42 As a result of Trosper, the dissent predicted that Ne-
braska's courts would become increasingly entangled in workplace
disputes. In particular, the dissent anticipated numerous scenarios in
which employers would be unfairly restricted when dealing with em-
ployees who fall under Trosper's protective umbrella:
[T]he reality is that ajob-related injury may bring about legitimate changes in
an employment relationship. A workers' compensation claimant may be tem-
porarily or permanently prevented from performing job requirements by the
physical effects of the injury. Will a transfer to a different position, perhaps at
a reduced wage, in order to accommodate the worker's diminished physical
abilities, now be deemed a retaliatory demotion? An employee who has filed a
workers' compensation claim is subject to the employer's work rules to the
same extent as other employees. Will routine disciplinary actions involving
workers' compensation claimants now be the basis for a retaliation lawsuit? If
there is a restructuring necessitated by changing business conditions, will the
employer be required to exempt workers' compensation claimants from any
changes in hours or job status in order to avoid a retaliation claim? Will an
employer be prevented from taking measures to address the unsatisfactory job
performance of an employee who has a pending workers' compensation
claim?
4 3
B. Other States' Case Law Discussed in Trosper
The question of whether a private right of action for retaliatory
discharge of employees who file workers' compensation claims should
be expanded to include retaliatory demotion was an isstie of first im-
pression in Nebraska. Consequently, the Court examined the rulings
of three states-Illinois, Kansas, and Utah-that previously ad-
dressed the same question. Each court reached a different conclusion.
In Illinois, an employee may not be fired for seeking compensation
under the State's workers' compensation laws.4 4 But in response to
an employee's pursuit of rights lawfully owed him under Illinois work-
ers' compensation laws, an employee may be unjustifiably demoted (in
job status or reduced salary) without protection from the state's public
policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.45 This is not the
case in Kansas where retaliatory discharge and demotion both violate
public policy because, as the Supreme Court of Kansas noted, the
damage to the employee differs in degree only.46 Utah's Supreme
Court has taken yet a different route and carved out a middle ground:
an employer's retaliation or discrimination against an employee for
42. Id. at 873-75, 734 N.W.2d at 716-17 (Stephan, J., dissenting). This view is con-
sistent with the traditional common law rule that an employer could terminate
an employee "for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong."
Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. at 518-19 (1884), overruled on other
grounds by, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
43. Trosper, 273 Neb. at 874-75, 734 N.W.2d at 717 (Stephan, J., dissenting).
44. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (Ill. 1978).
45. Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 645 N.E.2d 877 (Ill. 1994).
46. Brigham v. Dillon Cos., 935 P.2d 1054 (Kan. 1997).
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seeking workers' compensation does not trigger a public policy excep-
tion to the at-will employment doctrine unless the retaliation rises to
the level of a constructive or actual discharge. A constructive dis-
charge occurs when a reasonable employee would consider the work-
ing conditions intolerable.47 The Illinois and Utah opinions-because
they reached conclusions different than Trosper-provide especially
helpful points of comparison and thus are the focus of this section.
1. Illinois: Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc.
Like Nebraska, Illinois recognizes a private cause of action for re-
taliatory discharge when employees are fired for seeking compensa-
tion owed them under the State's workers' compensation laws.48 In
Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc.,49 the Illinois Supreme Court
addressed whether to extend its private cause of action for retaliatory
discharge to include retaliatory demotion. The case involved a plain-
tiff, Linda Zimmerman, an at-will employee, who filed a complaint
against her employer and claimed that her employer "demoted and
discriminated against" her when she sought compensation under the
Illinois Workers' Compensation Act (IWCA).50 Although she conceded
that her complaint did not state a cause of action for retaliatory dis-
charge, Zimmerman argued that "there must be some comparable doc-
trine, to protect employees from other distinct measures of retaliation,
short of an actual discharge."5 1 The trial court granted the defendant-
employer's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. The
Illinois Appellate Court reversed, concluding that retaliatory demo-
tion is an impermissible violation of public policy.52
47. Touchard v. La-Z-Boy Inc., 143 P.3d 945, 955 (Utah 2006).
48. Kelsay, 384 N.E.2d 353.
49. Zimmerman, 645 N.E.2d 877.
50. Id. at 878.
51. Id. at 878-79 (citing Kelsay, 384 N.E.2d 353).
52. Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 615 N.E.2d 791 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), over-
ruled by 645 N.E.2d 877. The Illinois Appellate Court concluded that recognizing
a public policy exception for retaliatory demotion was a necessary extension of
the preexisting exception for retaliatory discharge:
Plaintiff has suffered a loss of income and employment, but not a termi-
nation of her employment. We see little difference between retaliation
by loss of employment by termination and retaliation by reduction in
hours and demotion. If the allegations of the complaint are true, the
defendant clearly "discriminated" against the plaintiff in violation of the
[IWCA]....
Under these circumstances, a cause of action could lie to ensure that
the public policy behind the enactment of the [IWCA] is not frustrated.
It would be a bitter irony if employers were allowed to circumvent the
public policy recognized by the supreme court in Kelsay and adopted by
the [legislature] by performing retaliatory and "discriminatory" actions
short of termination. Public policy will not allow employers to frustrate
an employee's rights under the Workers' Compensation Act and to avoid
20081
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A plurality of the Illinois Supreme Court disagreed. 53 The Court
described the virtue of the retaliatory discharge exception as "its nar-
row and easily identifiable features,"54 and concluded that recognizing
a private cause of action for retaliatory demotion would insert ambigu-
ity into the law and increasingly involve courts in workplace dis-
putes.55 Though "the term 'demotion' may appear amenable to clear
definition,"56 the Court noted several uncertainties that would exist if
a private cause of action existed for retaliatory demotion: "Is a demo-
tion in title or status, but not salary, actionable? Could a transfer
from one department to another be considered a demotion? Would it
be fair to characterize as a demotion a significant increase in an em-
ployee's duties without an increase in salary?"57
The concurrence agreed with the plurality's holding that there is
no implied cause of action for retaliatory demotion under the IWCA,58
but emphasized the inconsistency in recognizing a private cause of ac-
tion for retaliatory discharge and not doing so for retaliatory demo-
tion.59 "[I]f we do not have a cause of action for retaliatory demotion,
we, in effect, will not have a cause of action for retaliatory discharge.
We have invited those who wish to discharge in retaliation to simply
demote in retaliation, and thereby escape the effect of the law."6 0 The
concurrence argued that the only explanation for this "apparent incon-
sistency"6 1 is an outright acknowledgment that the Court erred by
statutorily imposed duties by retaining the employee but demoting or
reducing the employee's hours.
Id. at 793-94.
53. Zimmerman, 645 N.E.2d at 882 ("We decline plaintiffs request to extrapolate
from the rationale of Kelsay a cause of action predicated on retaliatory
demotion.").
54. Id. ("Retaliatory discharge is considered a limited and narrow exception to the
general rule of at-will employment.") (quoting Hindo v. Univ. of Health Scis./Chi-
cago Med. Sch., 604 N.E.2d 463, 468 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)). Also note that Illinois
courts have refused to accept a "constructive discharge" concept. See, e.g.,
Hinthorn v. Roland's of Bloomington, Inc., 519 N.E.2d 909 (Ill. 1988); Dudycz v.
City of Chicago, 563 N.E.2d 1122 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
55. Zimmerman, 645 N.E.2d at 882. The court reasoned:
[Aldoption of plaintiffs argument would replace the well-developed
element of discharge with a new, ill-defined, and potentially all-encom-
passing concept of retaliatory conduct or discrimination. The courts
then would be called upon to become increasingly involved in the resolu-
tion of workplace disputes which center on employer conduct that here-




58. Id. at 885 (Bilandic, J., concurring).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (Bilandic, J., concurring). The concurrence states:
[I]t is my judgment that the only reasonable explanation for the appar-
ent inconsistency between the plurality decision and the Kelsay decision
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making an "unwarranted intrusion into the legislative arena to amend
the [IWCA] in a manner that the legislature had undoubtedly consid-
ered, but declined to adopt."
62
The dissent called the plurality's "basic flaw" the failure to realize
that "the tort of retaliatory demotion is not a variant of retaliatory
discharge, but rather a companion to it."63 Under the plurality's hold-
ing, the Court noted that an employer could take extraordinary mea-
sures-"demote a Vice President to a stock person, or reduce an
employee's hours from 40 hours per week to 1 hour per week, with
complete immunity from the civil justice system."6 4 Clearly, the pur-
pose and spirit of IWCA "would be no less undermined if employers
were permitted to discriminate against employees for seeking compen-
sation under the [IWCA] than it would be if they were permitted to
discharge such employees."6 5
2. Utah: Touchard v. La-Z-Boy Inc.
In Touchard v. La-Z-Boy Inc.,66 the Utah Supreme Court accepted
a question, on certification from the United States District Court for
the District of Utah, asking:
Whether the termination of an employee in retaliation for the exercise of
rights under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act (UWCA)... implicates a
'clear and substantial public policy' of the State of Utah that would provide a
basis for a claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
6 7
In the event that the Utah Supreme Court concluded that it did impli-
cate a clear and substantial public policy, the federal court also asked
whether the cause of action applies when: "the employee is not fired
but resigns under circumstances that constitute a 'constructive dis-
charge"'; and "the employee who has filed for benefits under the
[UWCA] is neither fired nor constructively discharged, but exper-
iences other discriminatory treatment or harassment from an
employer."68
is an outright acknowledgment that the Kelsay court erred when it rec-
ognized an 'implied' cause of action for retaliatory discharge ...
[R]ecognition of a cause of action for retaliatory discharge was clearly a
matter for the legislature and not the courts.
Id.
62. Id. ("[Hiad the legislature thought that recognition of a civil cause of action for
retaliatory discharge was desirable or necessary to effectuate the policies under-
lying the [IWCA], it would have included such a remedy within the statute.").
63. Id. at 887 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 882; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 2, Zimmerman, 645 N.E.2d 877 (No.
75793).
65. Zimmerman, 645 N.E.2d at 888 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
66. 148 P.3d 945 (Utah 2006).




Touchard began by providing a synopsis of Utah's at-will employ-
ment doctrine. Although an employer's decision to terminate an em-
ployee is presumed to be valid under Utah law, a discharged employee
can overcome this presumption if the termination of employment con-
stitutes a violation of clear and substantial public policy. 69 Utah's Su-
preme Court had previously identified four categories that "invoke a
'clear and substantial public policy': (1) discharging an employee for
'refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act'; (2) discharging an em-
ployee for 'performing a public obligation'; (3) discharging an employee
for 'exercising a legal right or privilege'; and (4) discharging an em-
ployee for reporting an employer's criminal activities to the appropri-
ate authorities. "70
Based on the principle that discharging an employee for exercising
a legal right or privilege violates public policy, Touchard held that ter-
minating an employee for seeking workers' compensation violates
public policy and thus creates a private cause of action. 7 1 Out of def-
erence to the state legislature, Touchard declined to extend this cause
of action to an employee who has suffered only harassment or discrim-
ination or to an employee who has been retaliated against for opposing
an employer's treatment of employees who are entitled to claim work-
ers' compensation benefits.72 The Court stated that, "[miuch as we
might lament the suffering of an employee who has been harassed for
exercising his or her statutory rights,... [e]mployees under these cir-
cumstances should look to the legislature to define their recourse
against employers who discriminate against them in retaliation for
claiming the compensation to which they are entitled."73
Another reason for requiring an actual or constructive discharge is
that the Court was particularly concerned with potential ambiguity in
attempting to find a working definition of actionable retaliatory har-
69. Id at 948 (quoting Fox v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1997)).
70. Id. at 948-49 (quoting Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 408 (Utah
1998)).
71. Id. at 953 ("If employers are permitted to penalize employees for filing workmen's
compensation claims .... [elmployees will not file claims for justly deserved com-
pensation-opting, instead to continue their employment without incident. The
end result, of course, is that the employer is effectively relieved of his obligation."
(quoting Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ind. 1973))).
72. Id. at 960.
73. Id. at 956. The court also noted that many other states have enacted such legisla-
tion. See e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 31-290a (2005) (prohibiting the discharge of or
discrimination against an employee who has exercised workers' compensation
rights and granting employees a private cause of action against employers who
violate the statute); Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.780 (2000) (prohibiting the discharge of
or discrimination against an employee who has exercised workers' compensation
rights and granting employees a private cause of action against employers who
violate the statute); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-241 (2005) (prohibiting retaliatory dis-
crimination against employees who have filed workers' compensation claims).
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assment and/or discrimination. The Court argued that strict adher-
ence to the discharge requirement was the best way to keep the
narrow and easily identifiable parameters of the public policy
exception. 74
Unique to Utah-in comparison to retaliation law in Nebraska, Il-
linois, and Kansas-is the concept of constructive discharge.75 Noting
that other jurisdictions have recognized that a constructive discharge
is the same as an actual discharge, 76 the Court held that a "resigna-
tion under working conditions that a reasonable employee would con-
sider intolerable is equivalent to a termination."77 Although
constructive discharge (like demotion) lacks the easily identifiable fea-
tures of a traditional discharge, the Court did not express concern that
the concept of constructive discharge would insert ambiguity into the
law.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Who Decides-Courts or Legislatures
Although the Trosper dissent raises the fundamental and contro-
versial question of whether courts should even venture into the area of
shaping public policy or leave policy judgments exclusively to the state
legislature, extended inquiry into the proper roles of the three
branches of government in America's representative democracy goes
74. Touchard, 148 P.3d at 955. The court explained:
The concept of discharge is fairly concrete-either the employer actually
terminated the employee or the employee resigned under circumstances
so unbearable that no reasonable employee could tolerate them. How-
ever, discrimination and harassment have the potential to implicate a
much broader range of behavior, including demotions, salary reductions,
job transfers, or disciplinary actions. If employees were allowed to bring
a cause of action for retaliatory discrimination, we fear the "courts would
be called upon to become increasingly involved in the resolution of work-
place disputes which center on employer conduct that heretofore has not
been actionable at common law."
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 645
N.E.2d 877, 882 (Ill. 1994)).
75. BLAci's LAw DICTIoNARY 495 (8th ed. 2004) defines constructive discharge as: "A
termination of employment brought about by making the employee's working
conditions so intolerable that the employee feels compelled to leave."
76. See, e.g., Breitsprecher v. Stevens Graphics, Inc., 772 So. 2d 1125, 1130 (Ala.
2000) (recognizing that an employee who was constructively discharged for claim-
ing workers' compensation benefits had a wrongful discharge cause of action
against her former employer); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 381
(Ark. 1988) (upholding a wrongful discharge jury instruction based on substantial
evidence of constructive discharge); Casenas v. Fujisawa USA, Inc., 67 Cal. Rptr.
2d 827, 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) ("a constructive discharge is legally regarded as a
firing rather than a resignation").
77. Touchard, 148 P.3d at 954.
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far beyond this Note's intended scope.78 Rather, this Note addresses
the policy implications of the Court's holding in Trosper, and provides
courts and employers with a guidebook for resolving the post-Trosper
ambiguity.
78. For an in-depth analysis of whether courts should defer to the state legislature on
public policy matters such as at-will employment, see Fahleson, supra note 6.
Fahleson's basic argument is that in a representative democracy, the legislature
is the proper body for determining the public policy of the jurisdiction, as well as
the remedies and means of the enforcement of its legislation. Given their fact-
finding and deliberative faculties, legislative bodies are better equipped to handle
the multi-faceted nature of shaping public policy. Not only do courts lack the
resources necessary to make these decisions, the basic structure of our govern-
mental system demands that basic political questions and value judgments be
decided through the legislative process. Courts are equipped to make decisions
when the record is laid out before them and the facts are confined to the specific
case at hand. Thus, a strong presumption against courts implying a private right
of action via the public policy exception to employment at-will should exist. Em-
ployees should look to the legislature to define their recourse against employers
who discriminate against them in retaliation for claiming the compensation to
which they are entitled. See id. at 979. Fahleson also argued that the Nebraska
State Legislature may have intentionally designed the NWCA not to include a
private right of action for employees who are discharged in retaliation for seeking
workers' compensation:
Clearly, it was foreseeable to the legislature that an employer could
evade its legal obligation to provide compensation to an injured em-
ployee by simply terminating the employee. The legislature may have
felt that such an omission was rational, considering the potential dam-
age to reputation, good will and employee morale that employers would
undoubtedly experience. The legislature may have concluded that this
loss to employers for terminating such employees was an adequate disin-
centive for employers. Moreover, the legislature may have chosen not to
provide a private remedy for fear of a possible flurry of lawsuits alleging
wrongful discharge for workers' compensation benefits.
Id. For an alternative view of the proper role of the judiciary, see Ronald Dwor-
kin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981); Robert Post & Reva
Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 373, 374 (2007). These commentators possess an expansive view of
the judiciary's role. They argue that courts serve as fora of principle and privi-
leged sites for the diffusion of human reason, and thus should be permitted, even
encouraged, to declare new rights and obligations where they are needed to pro-
tect important social values. A more moderate approach might argue that defer-
ence to the legislature-though an admirable goal-cannot always be achieved
because statutes are inherently open to interpretation, lack the hair-splitting dis-
tinctions to effectively resolve complex disputes unanticipated by the legislature,
or (in the case of the NWCA) contain loopholes that seemingly undermine its
purpose. Where the legislature has not adequately done its job, courts must do it
for them.
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B. Whether a Private Right of Action for Retaliatory
Demotion is Needed When a Private Right of Action
for Retaliatory Discharge is Already Recognized
Aside from abandoning precedent by holding that policy concerns
related to the NWCA should be left entirely to the legislature, Trosper
left the Nebraska Supreme Court with two basic options: holding that
(1) a private right of action for retaliatory demotion is an unnecessary
extension to the previously recognized cause of action for retaliatory
discharge, or (2) a private right of action for retaliatory demotion is an
indispensable companion to the private cause of action for retaliatory
discharge.
If Nebraska's highest court had elected not to recognize a private
cause of action for retaliatory demotion (the approach followed by the
Zimmerman plurality and Touchard), the purpose and spirit of the
NWCA, which the Court defended so vigorously in Jackson, would
have undeniably suffered. Leaving employees unprotected in situa-
tions of retaliatory demotion would have given employers an easy way
out. Any form of retaliation short of discharge would have been per-
missible, including a dramatic reduction in salary, status, or responsi-
bility. An Illinois employer, for example, can demote a Vice President
to a janitor, or reduce an employee's hours from 40 hours per week to 1
hour per week, with complete immunity from the civil justice system.
If Nebraska followed the same approach, employers could have
threatened a potential claimant with retaliation short of discharge but
substantial enough to deter the filing of a claim.79 This would have
created a workplace climate in which Jackson was virtually irrelevant
and the NWCA was subverted.
For economic and ethical reasons, most businesses likely would not
have intentionally used retaliatory tactics to reduce their workers'
compensation obligations.80 However, some unscrupulous employers
could have subjected employees to an unrestrained intimidation tac-
tic, as long as the retaliation fell somewhere below the level of dis-
charge. An employee might have been forced to settle for an injured or
untreated back, shoulder, or knee, rather than risk a significant re-
duction in salary at the hands of a vindictive employer. The NWCA
79. Trosper v. Bag 'N Save, 273 Neb. 855, 867, 734 N.W.2d 704, 712-13 (2007) (Ger-
rard, J., concurring) ("[Tihe overriding purpose of the [NWCA] would be seriously
frustrated if employers were able to prevent employees from filing claims through
the threat of discharge. The same is true for retaliation short of discharge-the
only difference is the nature and extent of the damage suffered by the
employee.").
80. See generally Fahleson, supra note 6, at 979 (quoting RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FOR-
BIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 155
(Harvard Univ. Press 1992) (To fire or retaliate against employees capriciously is




seeks to ensure that working Nebraskans should not have to make
such a choice, yet the dissent would have thrust it upon them. By rec-
ognizing a cause of action for retaliatory demotion and thereby prohib-
iting unscrupulous employers from demoting employees for exercising
their rights under the NWCA, the Trosper majority reached the only
conclusion capable of upholding the spirit and purpose of Jackson.81
Of course, Trosper also has its downside. With each additional ex-
ception to the at-will employment doctrine comes sacrifices in the eco-
nomic efficiency and administrative stability that the rule provides.
8 2
Employers will inevitably bear the cost of litigating workplace dis-
putes that would not be actionable but for Trosper.8 3 Employers are
also likely to lose time and energy in documenting employment ac-
tions taken with respect to employees involved in workers' compensa-
tion claims or in anticipation of litigation.8 4 Unscrupulous employees
may be inclined to fake injuries to temporarily insulate themselves
from the prospect of demotion.8 5 Collectively, these factors will result
in some degree of reduced productivity which may have the trickle-
down-effect of hurting employees in the way they are compensated,
and the quality and quantity of jobs available to them. Yet fundamen-
tal notions of fairness-an employee should not be demoted or fired
after suffering a work-related injury, the idea that employers are bet-
ter positioned (economically and otherwise) to bear the brunt of costs
associated with work related injuries, and the notion that employees
should not be demoted for pursuing a legal right or privilege-justify
these economic costs. 8 6 Indeed, the values and logic underlying Tros-
81. Trosper, 273 Neb. at 864, 734 N.W.2d at 710-11.
82. Fahleson, supra note 6, at 979.
83. See Cheryl S. Massingale, At-Will Employment: Going, Going. ., 24 U. RICH. L.
REV. 187 (1990). One commentator has stated:
The current system, which has evolved through judicially created excep-
tions, is expensive, time consuming, and does not serve either party well.
In addition to the uncertainty as to what termination actions will be
deemed wrongful, employers are subject to huge damages that are dis-




85. See generally Coalition Against Insurance Fraud, http://www.insurancefraud.org/
workers compscams.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2006) (detailing the widespread
nature of fraudulent workers' compensation claims).
86. One commentator states:
There are unquestionably terminations that involve outrageous conduct
by an employer or circumstances underlying a discharge that are so
egregious that the legal system cannot and should not condone the dis-
charge of the wronged employee. Traditionally, there has been consider-
able disparity between the bargaining positions of the employer and
employee, with the employer enjoying the upper hand.
Massingale, supra note 83, at 200-01.
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per are consistent with the legislature's enactment of the NWCA and
the Court's holding in Jackson.
C. Conceptualizing Retaliatory Demotion in a Way that
Minimizes Ambiguity for Courts and Employers
As the Trosper dissent (and the Zimmerman plurality and
Touchard majority) emphasized, replacing the well-developed element
of discharge with a new, difficult-to-define, and potentially all-encom-
passing concept of retaliatory conduct or discrimination inserts signif-
icant ambiguity into the law. This will require courts to develop new
principles for addressing the fairly ambiguous concept of retaliatory
demotion. Meanwhile, employers in the post-Trosper era are justifia-
bly confused as to how they should tailor their behavior to avoid legal
liability.8 7 In particular, employers are left guessing how they should
handle changing working conditions or unsatisfactory job performance
involving employees with past or pending workers' compensation
claims.88 This uncertainty is especially disconcerting given the tre-
mendous cost and disruption of business that is associated with
litigation.8 9
Clearly, Trosper has created many uncertainties among courts and
employers. These concerns cannot be dismissed until courts possess
an analytical framework capable of resolving them, and employers
achieve an understanding of how to comply with the NWCA in the
post-Trosper era. This section seeks to achieve those results.
1. A Guidebook for Courts
Whatever ambiguity Trosper has inserted into the law can be re-
solved by the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach.9 0 Courts
87. Interviews with Dallas D. Jones, Partner, Baylor, Evnen, Curtiss, Grimit & Witt,
in Lincoln, Neb. (September 20, 2007 & Oct. 4, 2007). Mr. Jones specializes in
representing and advising Nebraska employers on all workers' compensation is-
sues. Mr. Jones also serves on the Board of Directors for Nebraskans for Work-
ers' Compensation Equity, and frequently serves as an educational speaker at
workers' compensation seminars.
88. Id.
89. Fahleson, supra note 6, at 976.
90. In cases involving claims of employment discrimination, the Supreme Court of
Nebraska has recognized the burden-shifting analysis which originated in Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See, e.g., Billingsley v.
BFM Liquor Mgmt., Inc., 264 Neb. 56, 645 N.W.2d 791 (2002) (age discrimina-
tion); Father Flanagan's Boys' Home v. Agnew, 256 Neb. 394, 590 N.W.2d 688
(1999) (gender discrimination); Father Flanagan's Boys' Home v. Goerke, 224
Neb. 731, 401 N.W.2d 461 (1987) (discrimination against person with a disabil-
ity); Harris v. Misty Lounge, Inc., 220 Neb. 678, 371 N.W.2d 688 (1985) (retalia-
tory discharge for filing claim with Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission);
Zalkins Peerless Wiping Co. v. Neb. Equal Opp. Comm'n, 217 Neb. 289, 348
N.W.2d 846 (1984) (gender discrimination).
20081
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have "almost universally" adapted the McDonnell Douglas framework
from the employment discrimination context and applied it to retalia-
tion cases. 9 ' Where the McDonnell Douglas framework is lacking in
detail, this Note suggests incorporation of supplementary concepts
fundamental to employment discrimination law.
Step One of the proposed burden-shifting approach requires that
the plaintiff prove a prima facie case for retaliatory demotion. To es-
tablish such a prima facie case, 9 2 a plaintiff must establish that (1)
the employee participated in a protected activity (i.e., filed for work-
ers' compensation), (2) the employer took an adverse employment ac-
tion against him (i.e., demoted the employee), and (3) a causal
connection existed between the employee's filing for workers' compen-
sation and demotion.9 3
The first element will be easily determined: official state records
will show whether the employee has formally initiated the workers'
compensation process. If the employee has not formally initiated the
workers' compensation process, he has not participated in a protected
activity and thus cannot establish a prima facie case. However, in the
event that an employee was demoted immediately after being injured
yet prior to initiating the workers' compensation process, the employer
should not be permitted to escape liability solely because the demotion
occurred before the protected activity. The employee should be given a
reasonable period of time (perhaps 20 to 25 business days) to attain
protected activity status by filing the necessary papers to initiate the
workers' compensation process.
The second element hinges on what constitutes an adverse employ-
ment action. Because "[iut is well understood that some threshold
level of substantiality must be met for a plaintiff to make a prima facie
91. Donna Smith Cude & Brian M. Steger, Does Justice Need Glasses? Unlawful Re-
taliation Under Title VII Following Mattern' Will Courts Know It When They See
It?, 14 LAB. LAw. 373, 375, n.16 (citing Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d
1112, 1121-23 (5th Cir. 1998)); Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1561 (11th Cir.
1997); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 914 (1997); Hunt-Golliday v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist., 104 F.3d
1004, 1007 (7th Cir. 1997); Ruby v. Springfield R-12 Pub. Sch. Dist., 76 F.3d 909,
911 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1296 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 979 (1981)); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d
980, 985 (10th Cir. 1996); Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.
1994); Hazel v. U.S. Postmaster Gen., 7 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993); Cosgrove v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1993); Shirley v. Chrysler First,
Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 42 (5th Cir. 1992); McKenna v. Weinberger, 729 F.2d 783, 790
(D.C. Cir. 1984)).
92. See Riesen v. Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 272 Neb. 41, 48-49, 717 N.W.2d 907, 915
(2006). Though Riesen applied these elements to a case involving retaliatory dis-
charge, it noted that these elements parallel the Supreme Court of Nebraska's




case of unlawful retaliation,"94 this step requires developing a work-
ing definition of an adverse employment action that weeds out the
trivial harms that are part of every workplace and should not give rise
to civil liability. The concurring opinion in Trosper provided such
guidance:
A plaintiff sustains an adverse employment action ... if he or she suffers a
materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment. To be
materially adverse, a change in working conditions must be a significant
change in employment status, more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or
an altercation ofjob responsibilities .... [Ilt must be such that it might well
have dissuaded a reasonable worker from engaging in the activity protected
by public policy. Although the significance of any given act of retaliation will
often depend upon the particular circumstances, an employee's decision to en-
gage in protected activity cannot immunize that employee from those petty
slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employ-
ees experience. 9 5
Within this broad framework, courts should be equipped with ob-
jective factors to assess whether an adverse employment action was
taken against the plaintiff-employee. The Zimmerman dissent noted
that "loss of income and benefits" would be subject to redress under
any standard.9 6 Because income is the most tangible aspect of em-
ployment, any economic loss (including salary, stock options, and
health and retirement benefits) suffered by the employee should be
given the greatest weight in determining whether an adverse employ-
ment action occurred. Courts should also consider whether the plain-
tiff suffered a material change in job status or responsibility.9 7 In
making this assessment, courts should consider (1) any change in the
employee's job title or daily responsibilities,98 (2) whether the em-
ployee's background, qualifications, and experience are consistent
with the type of employee who typically performs such daily responsi-
94. Trosper v. Bag 'N Save, 272 Neb. 855, 870, 734 N.W.2d 709, 715 (2007) (Gerrard,
J., concurring) (citing Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274 (11th
Cir. 1999)).
95. Id. at 870-71, 734 N.W.2d at 714-15 (Gerrard, J., concurring).
96. Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 645 N.E.2d 877,888 (Ill. 1994) (Harrison,
J., dissenting).
97. See generally Edwin T. Hood & John J. Benge, Golden Parachute Agreements:
Reasonable Compensation or Disguised Bribery?, 53 UMKC L. REV. 199, 203
(1985) (suggesting that change in job status can be assessed by examining
whether there was a material change in employee's duties, change in employee's
job location, and whether employee has the qualifications needed to carry out the
duties of his new position).
98. Taking into account an employee's daily responsibilities, rather than merely as-
sessing an employee's job title, protects employees from situations where, for ex-
ample, a high-level employee keeps his job in name but his daily responsibilities
change from managerial duties to more remedial tasks that the employee has
never before performed as part of his employment.
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bilities,9 9 (3) whether a change in job location occurred,oo and (4)
whether a change in schedule or scheduling flexibility occurred.101
Based on this general framework for assessing whether an adverse
employment action occurred and the specific factors to aid in such an
inquiry, a jury instruction on this element might read:
Finding that an adverse employment action was taken requires you to con-
clude that the action taken against the employee, under all the circumstances,
would have dissuaded a reasonably prudent employee from seeking workers'
compensation. Some of the factors you may consider in making this assess-
ment include whether the plaintiff suffered a loss in salary, job status, or di-
minished responsibility or privileges at work.
Though admittedly less precise than the concept of discharge, this ap-
proach provides the trier-of-fact with a suitable framework that is
equivalent to other tests of reasonableness frequently and effectively
used throughout Nebraska law.10 2
Satisfying the third element requires showing that the employer's
adverse employment action was motivated by retaliation.103 Employ-
ers can take comfort: this element ensures that demoting an employee
involved in a workers' compensation claim does not make them per se
liable. Like dealing with any other employee, there are numerous
lawful reasons for demoting an employee (so long as the employee is
complying with all other requirements in Nebraska's workers' com-
pensation laws) notwithstanding that he has pursued workers' com-
99. Similar to the reason for analyzing whether a change in daily responsibilities
occurred, taking an employee's background qualifications into account ensures
that employees are not assigned to tasks for which they are abundantly over-
qualified to perform, such that-given the employee's background and qualifica-
tions-no reasonable manager would have assigned the employee to perform
such tasks absent some retaliatory purpose.
100. Taking into account job location prevents an employer from, without explanation,
transferring an employee, for example, from Omaha to Kearney, or making any
other change in job location that results in an unreasonable commute for the
employee.
101. Taking into account job scheduling protects an employee who, for example, had
been working 8 am to 5 pm from being moved, without explanation, to the "night
shift" from midnight to 8 am. This example is the most extreme form of schedul-
ing inconvenience; other forms of lesser scheduling inconvenience may also con-
stitute actionable demotion so long as the trier-of-fact concludes that the change
in scheduling would have dissuaded a reasonable employee from seeking workers'
compensation.
102. This sample jury instruction is based on generic definitions of "reasonableness"
for Nebraska jury instructions. See generally NJI2d Civ. 8.82 (2006) ("Reasona-
ble Care Defined: Reasonable care means the care that a reasonable person
would exercise under similar circumstances"); NJI2d Civ. 8.83 (2006) ("Unreason-
able Risk of Harm Defined: The term 'unreasonable risk of harm' means a risk
that a reasonable person, under all the circumstances of the case, would not allow
to continue.").
103. Riesen v. Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 272 Neb. 41, 49-50, 717 N.W.2d 907, 915 (2006).
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pensation.' 0 4 Only if the employee can prove that the demotion was
for purely retaliatory purposes will this element be satisfied.
Generally the third element must be satisfied by circumstantial ev-
idence, "since the employer is not apt to announce retaliation as its
motive."105 Circumstantial evidence capable of showing an employer's
retaliatory motives include: (1) "knowledge of the compensation claim
by those making the" adverse employment decision,1O6 (2) "expression
of a negative attitude toward the employee's injured condition,"0l7 (3)
"discriminatory treatment in comparison to similarly situated employ-
ees,"10 8 (4) "evidence that the stated reason for the discharge was
false,"10 9 (5) proximity in time between the employee seeking workers'
compensation and the demotion, 110 and (6) evidence of satisfactory
work performance and supervisory evaluations at or near the time of
the demotion.11
The complexity associated with determining whether a causal link
between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action in-
creases when larger employers and complex chains of command are
involved. An employer should not be able to escape liability merely
because the ultimate decision maker was unaware of the employee's
participation in the protected activity. Rather, a causal link may be
"established by evidence that the ultimate decision maker ... merely
'rubber stamped' a recommendation" to demote or "terminate . . . an
employee with [actual] knowledge of the protected activity."112 How-
ever, the causal link may be "severed if there is evidence that the ulti-
mate decision maker did not merely 'rubber stamp' the
recommendation of the employee with knowledge of the protected ac-
tivity, but conducted an independent investigation into the circum-
stances surrounding the employee's [demotion]" that uncovered
legitimate reasons for the employment action.113
Once an employee has established a prima facie case,1 14 Step Two
shifts the burden to the employer to articulate some legitimate, lawful
reason for the adverse employment action. The defendant must set
104. See generally Harris v. Misty Lounge, Inc., 220 Neb. 680, 371 N.W. 2d 690 (1985)
(stating that insubordination, inadequate work performance, and financial diffi-
culties of the employer are recognized as lawful justifications for demoting an
employee).




109. Id. at 50, 717 N.W.2d at 916.
110. Id. at 51, 717 N.W.2d at 916.
111. Id.
112. Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1122 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations
omitted).
113. Id.
114. Riesen, 272 Neb. at 47-49, 717 N.W.2d 914-15.
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forth "reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact,
would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the
cause of the employment action."115 Although this shifts the burden of
production to the defendant, the ultimate burden of persuading the
trier-of-fact always remains with the plaintiff.116 This phase of the
burden-shifting analysis essentially triggers the same analysis as the
third element of the prima facie case.1 17
The employer need only explain what has been done or produce
evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision. In
making this assessment, it is important to note that "[t]he filing of a
workers' compensation claim does not insulate the employee from the
requirement that he abide by all personnel rules.... Such... person-
nel polic[ies] must be applied in a neutral fashion, however."11S Any
non-retaliatory and consistently applied explanation for demoting an
employee would protect the employer from civil liability.119 Tradi-
tional grounds for discharging or demoting an employee-inadequate
work performance, the need to reduce costs in response to financial
difficulties, and insubordination-have all been recognized by the
Court as reasons that "adequately substantiate" a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the adverse employment action taken against
the plaintiff.120 This would ensure that, contrary to the doomsday ar-
guments made by the Trosper dissent, employers could effectively
manage their workforce, even where employment actions with em-
ployees involved in the workers' compensation process are concerned.
If the employer establishes-merely through the burden of produc-
tion, not the burden of proof-an articulated nondiscriminatory rea-
son for disparate treatment of an employee, Step Three imposes on the
plaintiff-employee the burden of proving that the stated reason was
pretextual and not the true reason for the employer's decision; i.e.,
that the adverse employment action would not have occurred "but for"
the employer's retaliatory motives.121 A pretext is a "reason that the
employer offers for the action claimed to be discriminatory and that
the court disbelieves, allowing an inference that the employer is trying
to conceal a discriminatory reason for his action . ... "122
The same pieces of circumstantial evidence used previously should
be emphasized at this stage of the inquiry. Particularly relevant
115. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home v. Agnew, 256 Neb. 394, 402, 590 N.W.2d 688, 694
(1999).
116. Id. at 404, 590 N.W.2d at 694-95.
117. Parada v. Great Plains, 483 F. Supp. 2d 777, 815 (N.D. Iowa 2007).
118. Riesen, 272 Neb. at 54, 717 N.W.2d at 918 (quoting 6 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K.
LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAw § 104.07[4] (2005)).
119. Id. at 47-48, 717 N.W.2d at 913-14.
120. Harris v. Misty Lounge, Inc., 220 Neb. 678, 683, 371 N.W.2d 688, 692 (1985).
121. Riesen, 272 Neb. at 52, 717 N.W. 2d at 917.
122. Id. (quoting Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 837 n.4 (8th Cir. 1997)).
[Vol. 87:270
RESOLVING THE AMBIGUITY
pieces of circumstantial evidence include: (1) temporal proximity be-
tween the employee's filing for workers' compensation and the demo-
tion,12 3 (2) temporal proximity between the demotion and favorable
performance evaluations, (3) treatment of other employees who pos-
sess the same deficiency the plaintiff is purportedly being demoted
for,1 2 4 (4) the employer's reaction to the plaintiff-employee's work-re-
lated injury as expressed to the plaintiff-employee and other employ-
ees, 125 (5) the employer's treatment of the employee throughout his
entire course of employment, and (6) general company policy when
dealing with employees involved in workers' compensation claims.1 26
Statistics (as to the percentage of past employees whose attempts to
collect workers' compensation occurred without dispute) can help de-
termine an employer's motives and general pattern of fair dealing
with workers' compensation claims.12
7
At this final stage, the burden of proving that the proffered reason
was not the true reason for the adverse employment action merges
with the ultimate burden of persuading the trier-of-fact that the plain-
tiff-employee has been the victim of intentional retaliation for seeking
workers' compensation.128 The ultimate issue of retaliation requires
123. Id. at 52-53, 717 N.W.2d at 917-18 (The plaintiff was fired at a time when both
parties were anticipating further litigation. Id. The Court distinguished this sit-
uation from one in which a discharged employee had filed a workers' compensa-
tion claim that had been settled and satisfied without serious dispute.) Id.
124. The plaintiffs case would benefit greatly from presenting evidence that other em-
ployees with somewhat similar performance deficiencies who had not filed for
workers' compensation were not demoted. See generally id. at 52-54, 717 N.W.2d
at 917-18 (The stated reason for the employer's decision to fire the plaintiff-em-
ployee was that he had misrepresented information on his initial employment
application, and that it was company policy to terminate employees who did so.
Id. But the defendant-company's director of human resources, when deposed,
could not recall ever taking a disciplinary action against a similarly situated em-
ployee. Id. The Court concluded that such evidence supports an inference that
defendant-company itself does not consider the inclusion of such information as
essential and material and thus jumped "at the first pre-textual low-grade reason
to terminate him." Id.
125. See id. at 52-55, 717 N.W.2d at 917-19 (The Court concluded that the evidence
could create an inference that the plaintiff-employee was not terminated for the
employer's stated reason. Id. Rather, the employee was actually fired because
the employer was upset with plaintiff-employee over his compensable injury. Id.
The evidence introduced to create this inference included the employer telling
another employee that, "the little son of a bitch is faking ... it would be a lot
easier ... if [he] would just quit." Id. Additionally, employer told plaintiff-em-
ployee that "[y]ou finally messed up ... you lied on your work comp application.")
Id.
126. Christine E. Webber, A Plaintiffs Perspective on Some Evidentiary Issues and
Jury Instructions in Employment Discrimination Litigation (With Sample In-
structions), 32 ALI-ABA Bus. L. COURSE MATERIALS J. 29 (2007).
127. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
128. Harris v. Misty Lounge, Inc., 220 Neb. 678, 684, 371 N.W.2d 688, 692 (1985).
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the employee prove to the trier-of-fact that the adverse employment
action would not have occurred "but for" the protected activity.129
2. A Guidebook for Employers
Most suggestions contained herein are premised on the notion that
the Court will heed the advice of Trosper's concurring opinion by
adopting the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis as the ana-
lytical framework for retaliatory demotion cases. Although the Court
may decline to follow such an approach, the principles set forth are
almost certainly relevant under any framework for assessing retalia-
tory demotion. Many employers already may have implemented some
of these suggestions. Even so, this section should help employers
identify major themes and sources of tension within the emerging law
of retaliatory demotion.
As a starting point, employers should establish a comprehensive
system of documentation that includes objective criteria for making
employment decisions.130 While employers may feel burdened by this
suggestion, the law in Nebraska is clear: "Employment decisions
based on subjective standards carry little weight in rebutting charges
of discrimination" and, presumably, retaliation in the post-Trosper
era. 13 1 An employer's subjective "gut reaction" will not constitute a
legitimate explanation for demoting an employee. Rather, employers
demoting an employee involved in the workers' compensation process
should have documentation of objective factors that justify the em-
ployment action.13 2
Employers should also document when they first learn of an em-
ployee's work-related injury and the employee's decision to seek work-
ers' compensation. Proximity in time between the claim and adverse
employment action is a typical beginning point for courts in search of
a causal connection between the employee's protected activity and the
adverse employment action. 133 Common sense suggests that an em-
129. Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1122 (5th Cir. 1998).
130. See Anna M. Archer, Comment, Shopping for a Collective Voice When Unioniza-
tion is Unattainable: 1.6 Million Women Speak Up in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 42 Hous. L. REv. 837, 875 (2005).
[I]n determining the objective criteria for a certain position, the follow-
ing factors should be considered: (1) purpose-the reason for the job, (2)
essential functions-the job duties which are critical or fundamental to
the performance of the job, (3) job setting-the work station and condi-
tions where the essential functions are performed, and (4) job qualifica-
tions-the minimal skills an individual must possess to perform the
essential functions.
Id.
131. Zalkins Peerless Wiping Co. v. Neb. Equal Opp. Comm'n, 217 Neb. 289, 295-96,
348 N.W.2d 846, 850 (1984).
132. Id.
133. Parada v. Great Plains, 483 F. Supp. 2d 777, 814 (N.D. Iowa 2007).
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ployer who demotes an employee one day after learning that the em-
ployee filed for workers' compensation will be viewed suspiciously.
Conversely, an employer who demotes an employee after a workers'
compensation claim has been completely resolved without serious dis-
pute will be viewed less suspiciously.134
Employers should not assume that actionable demotion cannot oc-
cur after the workers' compensation claim has been resolved. An em-
ployee (in good faith or bad) can bring an action alleging that he was
demoted in retaliation for his earlier assertion of workers' compensa-
tion long after resolution of the claim. Unscrupulous employers could
also be advantaged. A vindictive and patient employer determined to
retaliate against an employee for seeking workers' compensation who
realized that he would face a higher potential for civil liability if he
retaliated against the employee via demotion or discharge anytime in
the immediate future might wait for five, ten, or even fifteen years
before demoting the employee.
Though it may be tempting to create a bright-line rule for a time
after which no retaliatory demotion claims may be brought, a funda-
mental concept in employment discrimination law is that the time for
filing an employment discrimination charge begins when the discrimi-
natory act occurs.13 5 In instances of retaliatory demotion, the dis-
criminatory act is the demotion. When an employer's subjective
intentions for demoting the employee are purely retaliatory, an em-
ployee should have a private right of action under Trosper regardless
of the timing of the demotion.136 The proximity in time of the lawsuit
in relation to the employee's previous assertion of workers' compensa-
tion should never be dispositive.137 Rather, the issue of time should
be viewed on a sliding scale: the further removed from seeking or
resolving an employee's workers' compensation claim, the less likely
that any adverse employment action taken against the employee
should be seen as retaliation.13
8
134. See supra note 123.
135. Perry A. Craft & Michael G. Sheppard, 2007 Supreme Court Review for Tennessee
Lawyers, TENN. B.J., Feb. 2007, at 22, 27 (citing Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(e)(5)(1)).
136. This could not be satisfied within the confines of any statute of limitations. The
statute of limitations period would begin running with discovery of the triggering
activity (i.e., demotion) which could occur long after the compensable work-re-
lated injury and even long after resolution of the workers' compensation process.
137. Jones, supra note 87.
138. There is economic reasoning underlying the notion that employers will be less
likely to retaliate or fire capriciously long after resolution of a workers' compensa-
tion dispute. Turnover and unrest among employees results in reduced stability
and cohesion, which ultimately leads to reduced productivity. See Fahleson,
supra note 6, at 979 n.114 (citing RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE
CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAws 155 (Harvard Univ. Press
2008] 295
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Employers should also note the significance of proximity in time
between positive employee performance evaluations and the demo-
tion.139 Evidence of unsatisfactory work performance at the time of
the adverse employment action maximizes employers' chances for es-
tablishing non-retaliatory motives for the change in employment sta-
tus. It is not enough for the plaintiff to show that he had performed
well for some period during his employment. Nor does collecting
workers' compensation entitle an employee to a career lacking in pro-
ductivity. The plaintiff must show that he was performing well at the
time of the demotion.140 Thus, when dealing with employees who
have sought workers' compensation, employers should feel comforta-
ble demoting an employee who is performing poorly at the time of the
demotion, but employers should be reluctant to demote an employee
who has earned favorable evaluations around the time of the
demotion.
Another factor employers should emphasize is the treatment of
similarly situated employees. This includes employees who (1) have
pursued workers' compensation and (2) possess a deficiency (which
purportedly justifies the adverse employment action taken against the
plaintiff) similar to the plaintiff. For the first category of similarly
situated employees, employers should document all employees who
have sought workers' compensation. This log should include the job
status, salary, and responsibilities of all employees before and after
suffering a compensable work-related injury. If a significant change
in job status occurred as a result of the work-related injury or in close
proximity to the work-related injury, a thorough medical and busi-
ness-related explanation should be given for the change in job status.
These business records will help employers show a history of good-
faith compliance with the NWCA and, if litigation arises, provide doc-
umentation that justifies the employment action.
For the second category, when demoting an employee who has pre-
viously collected workers' compensation, employers should be able to
provide documentation of (1) the employee's deficiency and (2) adverse
employment action taken against employees with deficiencies similar
to what the plaintiff was demoted for. Consider the following hypo-
thetical scenario. "Ernie the Employee" has brought an action against
his employer, alleging that he was demoted in pay for seeking work-
ers' compensation. "Bob the Boss" does not deny demoting Ernie's sal-
ary from fifteen dollars to twelve dollars per hour at some point after
Ernie sought workers' compensation. However, Bob claims that his
1992) ("To fire capriciously ...is exceedingly costly to the firm because of its
effects on the morale of the remaining workers.")).
139. Thomas C. Britton & W. Bradley Colwell, Survey of Illinois Law: Significant De-
velopments in Education Law 2001 & 2002, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 741, 778-79 (2003).
140. Salvadori v. Franklin Sch. Dist., 293 F.3d 989, 996 (7th Cir. 2002).
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reason for demoting Ernie is that he frequently arrives late to work,
not because Ernie sought workers' compensation. If Bob has docu-
mentation to verify that (1) Ernie frequently arrives late towork and
(2) five other employees have consistently arrived late to work and
their salary was reduced three dollars per hour for doing so, then
Bob's motives for demoting Ernie do not seem retaliatory. Under
these circumstances, Bob is unlikely to be held liable for retaliatory
demotion because the impetus for the demotion was legitimate. Con-
versely, if Bob (1) has documentation that Ernie frequently arrives
late to work but (2) admits that several other employees frequently
arrive late to work and Ernie is the first employee who has been de-
moted for doing so, then Bob's motives for demoting Ernie look retalia-
tory. Under these circumstances, Bob is far more likely to be liable for
retaliatory demotion. The lesson is: an employer seeking to justify an
adverse employment action because of an employee's purported defi-
ciency should have documentation that other employees with a similar
deficiency faced the same consequences.
Finally, employers would be well served by utilizing increased dia-
logue (both formal and informal) with employees who have suffered
work-related injuries, especially those employees whose injury may
require a change in job status. Informal dialogue will be useful in
building positive relationships and reducing tension among manage-
ment and employees. 14 1 This will provide employees with an opportu-
nity to express their concerns which likely will reduce employees'
thoughts that their employers are "out to get them" by demoting them
for seeking workers' compensation.142 Increased employee morale is
one way to reduce the risk of employee-initiated litigation.1
43
As part of the formal dialogue, employers should require that all
employees involved in workers' compensation claims fill out a survey
(at the beginning of the workers' compensation process, during the
process, and at regular increments after the process has been re-
solved) documenting the employee's level of satisfaction with their em-
141. Daniel B. Klaff, Evaluating Work: Enforcing Occupational Safety and Health
Standards in the United States, Canada and Sweden, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
613, 637 (2005) (A dialogue between employees and employers that guarantees
worker participation "creates a situation that is much more amenable to negotia-
tion and resolution.").
142. See Naomi Schoenbaum, It's Time That You Know: The Shortcomings of Igno-
rance as Fairness in Employment Law and the Need for an "Information-Shifting"
Model, 30 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 99, 134 (2007) ("A genuine dialogue among em-
ployees and employers is required to acknowledge fully employees' concerns
.... "); Mariejoy Mendoza, Note, Making Friends: Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace, Free Speech, and Lyle v. Warner Bros., 40 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1963,
1990 (2007) (encouraging employers to promote an open dialogue with employees
as a useful tool for combating sexual harassment).
143. Melanie Lewis, Systems Design Means Process Precision, But Emphasizes Cul-
ture, Value, and Results, 25 ALT. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 113 (2007).
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ployer's handling of their workers' compensation claim at various
stages of the process.14 4 These surveys should ask pointed questions,
such as:
Have your salary, job status, or responsibilities changed in any way as a re-
sult of your decision to seek workers' compensation?
Are you satisfied with how your employer has treated you throughout the
workers' compensation process?
Has your employer retaliated or discriminated against you, or made you feel
unwanted or guilty, in any way, since you initiated the workers' compensation
process?
Has your employer ever threatened to demote, discriminate, or retaliate
against you or another employee, in any way, for seeking workers'
compensation?
Although an employee's satisfaction with the workers' compensation
process at one point in time does not guarantee that the employer
could not retaliate against such an employee at a later point in time, it
certainly helps the employer demonstrate a history of compliance and
good-faith treatment of employees who have pursued workers'
compensation. 145
While these additional precautionary measures will cost busi-
nesses time and energy, operating proactively will help ward off costly
litigation in the post-Trosper era. Moreover, in the event that an em-
ployer becomes embroiled in litigation for retaliatory demotion, the
ability to produce documentation of a legitimate reason for demoting
the employee combined with a history of non-retaliatory responses to
employees who have suffered work-related injuries will minimize the
employer's exposure to liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
Extending the public policy exception to at-will employment to in-
clude a private cause of action for retaliatory demotion was the only
decision the Trosper Court could have reached that was logically con-
sistent with its prior holding in Jackson. Though Trosper was cor-
rectly decided, the dissent accurately anticipated that it would insert
144. See Richard B. Peterson & David Lewin, Research on Unionized Grievance Proce-
dures: Management Issues and Recommendations, 39 HuM. RESOURCE MGMT.
395, 403 (2000) (recommending periodic employment surveys of employees' per-
ceptions of grievance procedures and grievance procedure outcomes as a way of
enhancing overall effectiveness of such procedures); Margaret L. Shaw, Design-
ing and Implementing In-House Dispute Resolution Programs, in ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR): How To USE IT TO YOUR ADVANTAGE, ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALus 447, 454-55 (1999) (suggesting surveys, interviews,
and focus groups to determine proper goals of grievance procedures).
145. Peterson & Lewin, supra note 144, at 403.
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significant ambiguity into the law. 146 This Note endeavors to help
courts and employers resolve that uncertainty.
Nebraska courts should adopt the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting analysis as an analytical framework for deciding retaliatory
demotion cases and, where necessary, supplement this analytical
framework with fundamental concepts from employment discrimina-
tion law. The private remedy created by Trosper is designed to protect
employees who are being retaliated against, or stated differently, dis-
criminated against, for seeking workers' compensation. Demotion like
discrimination (and unlike discharge) is not easily identified or quan-
tified. Yet Nebraska courts have consistently overcome such ambigu-
ity to pursue the greater good by rooting out discrimination in
workplaces. The Court has applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting approach in a plethora of employment discrimination
cases. 14 7 Given the similarities in what is required to prove demotion
and retaliation, many other jurisdictions have recognized that the Mc-
Donnell Douglas burden-shifting approach is equally applicable to the
developing law of retaliation in the employment context.148 If Ne-
braska follows suit, its courts will be equipped to eliminate another
form of employment discrimination: retaliatory demotion of employees
seeking workers' compensation.
Meanwhile, Nebraska's employers should take a number of precau-
tionary measures to preempt litigation when possible and reduce their
exposure to liability when litigation is inevitable. To reduce litigation,
employers should operate with a renewed commitment to opening dia-
logue between employees and management. If the workers' compen-
sation process is more transparent and employees have a forum to
voice their concerns, they are less likely to feel like their employers
are "out to get them" and presumably less likely to bring lawsuits
against their employers.
To minimize exposure to liability-if and when litigation arises in
the context of workers' compensation-employers should develop ob-
jective criteria for making employment decisions and increase docu-
mentation of any employment action taken against an employee who
has suffered a work-related injury. When taking an adverse employ-
ment action against an employee who has pursued workers' compen-
sation, an employer must be able to articulate a legitimate reason for
the employment action and show that other employees who possessed
a similar deficiency faced the same consequences. Employers would
then present the documentation justifying their decision during Step
Two of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. Without
146. Trosper v. Bag 'N Save, 273 Neb. 855, 875-76, 734 N.W.2d 704, 717-18 (Stephan,
J., dissenting).
147. See supra note 90.
148. See supra note 91.
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such justification, a trier-of-fact is more likely to conclude that an em-
ployer's motives were retaliatory.
In sum, the best recipe for Nebraska's employers to cope with the
uncertainty of the post-Trosper era is through increased transparency
in all facets of the workers' compensation process, establishing objec-
tive criteria for making personnel decisions, and extensive documen-
tation of any adverse employment action taken against an employee
who has suffered a work-related injury. Given this guidebook for
resolving the post-Trosper ambiguity, employers should not be overly
concerned. They are not prohibited from demoting an ineffective or
uncooperative employee who has previously received workers' com-
pensation. They just need to be thoroughly prepared to explain their
decision.
